Defensive Federalism

Protecting Territorial Minorities from the "Tyranny of the Majority"
 
Edition number: 1
Publisher: Routledge
Date of Publication:
 
Normal price:

Publisher's listprice:
GBP 120.00
Estimated price in HUF:
58 590 HUF (55 800 HUF + 5% VAT)
Why estimated?
 
Your price:

52 731 (50 220 HUF + 5% VAT )
discount is: 10% (approx 5 859 HUF off)
The discount is only available for 'Alert of Favourite Topics' newsletter recipients.
Click here to subscribe.
 
Availability:

Estimated delivery time: Currently 3-5 weeks.
Not in stock at Prospero.
Can't you provide more accurate information?
 
  Piece(s)

 
 
 
 
Product details:

ISBN13:9781032281964
ISBN10:10322819611
Binding:Hardback
No. of pages:226 pages
Size:234x156 mm
Weight:576 g
Language:English
Illustrations: 2 Illustrations, black & white; 2 Line drawings, black & white; 8 Tables, black & white
781
Category:
Short description:

Defensive Federalism presents an original contribution to the field of federalism and multinational democracies, exploring the concept of defensive federalism as a protection of self-government against the "tyranny of the majority".

Long description:

1. Defensive Federalism: Tackling the Two Faces of the Territorial Tyranny of the Majority. A Revised Federal Institutional Design, 2. Consociational Executives: Power-Sharing Governments Between Inclusion and Functionality?, 3. Exclusive Powers and Self-Governed Entities: A Tool for Defensive Federalism?, 4. The Limits of Self Rule without Shared Rule, 5. Constitutional Asymmetries as an (In)effective Counterbalancing Tool in Protecting Territorial Self-Government?, 6. Political Asymmetries: ?Opting In and Opting Out? Decision-Making Procedures in Canada, 7. Agreeing to Disagree: Federal Veto Powers in Switzerland, 8. The Role of Constitutional Judges in Protecting Territorial Self-Government, 9. The Defensiveness of Nation-States: Preventing Majority Domination in the European Union, 10. Federal Chiaroscuros: Concluding Remarks

Table of Contents:

1. Defensive Federalism: Tackling the Two Faces of the Territorial Tyranny of the Majority. A Revised Federal Institutional Design, 2. Consociational Executives: Power
-Sharing Governments Between Inclusion and Functionality?, 3. Exclusive Powers and Self
-Governed Entities: A Tool for Defensive Federalism?, 4. The Limits of Self Rule without Shared Rule, 5. Constitutional Asymmetries as an (In)effective Counterbalancing Tool in Protecting Territorial Self
-Government?, 6. Political Asymmetries: ?Opting In and Opting Out? Decision
-Making Procedures in Canada, 7. Agreeing to Disagree: Federal Veto Powers in Switzerland, 8. The Role of Constitutional Judges in Protecting Territorial Self
-Government, 9. The Defensiveness of Nation
-States: Preventing Majority Domination in the European Union, 10. Federal Chiaroscuros: Concluding Remarks