Constitutional Change under Autocracy
Series: Oxford Comparative Constitutionalism;
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 20 January 2026
- ISBN 9780198895534
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages240 pages
- Size 243x163x21 mm
- Weight 549 g
- Language English 672
Categories
Short description:
Through a large-N comparative analysis of autocratic regimes and case studies on the GDR, Azerbaijan, and Mexico, this book reflects on how constitutional amendments reinforce regime stability.
MoreLong description:
With the majority of the global population still living under surprisingly stable autocratic regimes, we can assume that regime stability is the ultimate objective of autocratic leadership. However, this stability is continually challenged, so autocrats deploy various instruments to defend their hegemonic power.
Constitutional Change under Autocracy examines one such instrument, the strategic use of constitutional amendments to reinforce regime stability. Through a large-N comparative analysis and illustrative case studies of Azerbaijan, Mexico, and the German Democratic Republic (GDR), this book demonstrates that constitutional amendments are far more than technical legal adjustments. Instead, they serve as deliberate tools for consolidating power, managing internal rivalries, and mitigating external threats. By enhancing - or attempting to enhance-regime legitimacy, these amendments can play a pivotal role in stabilizing autocratic regimes.
Insightful and analytical, this book reflects on the implications of the instrumentalization of law and challenges our expectations about the role of constitutions under autocracy.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
A Theory of Constitutional Change under Autocracy
Why Are Autocratic Constitutions Amended?
Strategic Constitutional Amendments and Autocratic Succession in Azerbaijan
Threats from the Opposition: Religion, the State, and the PRI in Mexico
Reinterpreting Nationhood under Threat from the Outside: The GDR's 1974 Constitutional Amendment
Conclusion
