Consciousness and its Objects
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Product details:
- Publisher Oxford University Press
- Date of Publication 13 April 2006
- ISBN 9780199297634
- Binding Paperback
- No. of pages272 pages
- Size 216x138x16 mm
- Weight 320 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
Colin McGinn presents his latest work on consciousness in ten interlinked essays, four of them previously unpublished. He extends and deepens his controversial solution to the mind-body problem, defending the view that consciousness is both ontologically unproblematic and epistemologically impenetrable. He discusses the status of first-person authority; argues that all intentionality involves non-existent objects; and suggests that atomism about the conscious mind might be true, and
that mind-body dualism is more credible the more extreme it is. On all these topics his views are surprising, in line with his belief that what the philosophy of mind needs now is 'methodological radicalism' - a willingness to consider new and seemingly extravagant ideas.
Long description:
Colin McGinn presents his latest work on consciousness in ten interlinked essays, four of them previously unpublished. He extends and deepens his controversial solution to the mind-body problem, defending the view that consciousness is both ontologically unproblematic and epistemologically impenetrable. He also investigates the basis of our knowledge that there is a mind-body problem, and the bearing of this on attempted solutions.
McGinn goes on to discuss the status of first-person authority, the possibility of atomism with respect to consciousness, extreme dualism, and the role of non-existent objects in constituting intentionality. He argues that traditional claims about our knowledge of our own mind and of the external world can be inverted; that atomism about the conscious mind might turn out to be true; that dualism is more credible the more extreme it is; and that all intentionality involves non-existent objects.
These are all surprising positions, but he contends that what the philosophy of mind needs now is 'methodological radicalism' - a willingness to consider new and seemingly extravagant ideas.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
What Constitutes the Mind-Body Problem?
How Not to Solve the Mind-Body Problem
Solving the Philosophical Mind-Body Problem
What Is It Not Like to be a Brain?
Consciousness and Space
Consciousness, Atomism, and the Ancient Greeks
Consciousness and Cosmology: Hyperdualism Ventilated
The Problem of Philosophy
Inverted First-Person Authority
The Objects of Intentionality
