Compassionate Moral Realism
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 14 June 2018
- ISBN 9780198809685
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages270 pages
- Size 241x164x24 mm
- Weight 594 g
- Language English
- Illustrations Colin Marshall offers a ground-up defense of objective morality, in which the central role is played by compassion. Only compassion, Marshall argues, lets us be in touch with others' motivational mental properties. Compassionate Moral Realism offers a new 0
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Short description:
Colin Marshall offers a ground-up defense of objective morality, in which the central role is played by compassion. Only compassion, Marshall argues, lets us be in touch with others' motivational mental properties. Compassionate Moral Realism offers a new answer to the question "Why be moral?", a central philosophical concern since Plato.
MoreLong description:
Colin Marshall offers a ground-up defense of objective morality, drawing inspiration from a wide range of philosophers, including John Locke, Arthur Schopenhauer, Iris Murdoch, Nel Noddings, and David Lewis. Marshall's core claim is compassion is our capacity to perceive other creatures' pains, pleasures, and desires. Non-compassionate people are therefore perceptually lacking, regardless of how much factual knowledge they might have. Marshall argues that people who do have this form of compassion thereby fit a familiar paradigm of moral goodness. His argument involves the identification of an epistemic good which Marshall dubs "being in touch". To be in touch with some property of a thing requires experiencing it in a way that reveals that property - that is, experiencing it as it is in itself. Only compassion, Marshall argues, lets us be in touch with others' motivational mental properties.
This conclusion about compassion has two important metaethical consequences. First, it generates an answer to the question "Why be moral?", which has been a central philosophical concern since Plato. Second, it provides the keystone for a novel form of moral realism. This form of moral realism has a distinctive set of virtues: it is anti-relativist, naturalist, and able to identify a necessary connection between moral representation and motivation. The view also implies that there is an epistemic asymmetry between virtuous and vicious agents, according to which only morally good people can fully face reality.
Marshall's book is an impressive achievement. Not only is it a case study in how philosophers can make contemporary use of seemingly disparate historicalmaterial (his use of the early modern theory of ideas in defending his epistemological account of compassion is especially impressive), but it brings together novel argumentation spanning topics large and small across both normative and metaethics.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
PART 1: THE CORE ARGUMENT
"Why be Moral?" and Epistemic Goods
Locke and Compassion
Being in Touch
Compassion and Being in Touch
PART 2: AN ANSWER TO "WHY BE MORAL?"
Beyond the Present
Pleasure and Desires
Combination and Comparison
The Scope of Compassion and Impartiality
The Hardest Cases
So what?
PART 3: MORAL REALISM
Criteria for Moral Realism
The Truth that Pain is Bad
Representing and Caring that Pain is Bad
Knowing that Pain is Bad
Summary and Prospects for Extension
Appendix A: Affect and Well-Functioning Agents
Appendix B: Body and Mind
Appendix C: The Content of Pain