Aristotle on What Emotions Are
Series: Oxford Aristotle Studies Series;
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 16 August 2024
- ISBN 9780198879343
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages400 pages
- Size 240x160x26 mm
- Weight 754 g
- Language English 562
Categories
Short description:
Providing the first systematic interpretation of what Aristotle thinks emotions are and pointing to some philosophical merits of his account, this book addresses, among other things, his view on how emotions form; how they relate to beliefs and perceptions; how they relate to desires; and how different emotions are distinguished from each other.
MoreLong description:
This book provides the first systematic interpretation of what Aristotle thinks occurrent emotions are and points to some philosophical merits of his account. It is argued that he holds that emotions are representational pleasures or distresses that are formed in response to other intentional states that apprehend their objects. Even this bare formulation of his view is notable in several respects. First, the idea that the pleasures or distresses of emotions are representational--directed at objects in the world (or ourselves)--contrasts sharply with accounts that identify emotions with non-representational sensations or feelings. Second, the notion that emotions are pleasurable or distressful responses to other intentional states that apprehend their objects provides a fundamental contrast with many current accounts which instead view emotions as (in part) modes of apprehension or kinds of epistemic state themselves. Third, Aristotle's view stands in opposition to motivational accounts of emotions, insofar as while he thinks that emotions interact with desires or motivational states in important ways, he does not think they are themselves (even in part) motivational states. They are representational pleasures or distresses alone. Together, these three points give Aristotle a novel understanding of the representational role emotions play; namely, neither descriptive, nor prescriptive, but reactive. Besides developing these ideas, both textually and philosophically, the book also explores how Aristotle individuates emotion types; his understanding of the material dimension of emotions; and how his view can provide a novel explanation of recalcitrant emotions, a notoriously problematic phenomenon for many recent accounts of emotions.
The reader who studies this book and compares it carefully with Aristotle's text will learn a great deal, the process would have been made easier by a number of editorial modifications, such as supplying missing words and numerals and observing the difference of gerunds from participles.
Table of Contents:
Introduction : What This Book Aims to Achieve (and What It Doesn't). A Map
Some Key Terminology and Distinctions. The Prospects for an Analysis of Emotions in Terms of Other Intentional States
PART I. EMOTIONS AS PLEASURES AND DISTRESSES
Emotions as Representational Hedonic States
Pleasure and Distress as Contributing to the Individuation of Emotion Types
Emotions as Hedonic States That Are Formed in Response to Intentional States That Apprehend Their Objects
Emotions and the Account(s) of Pleasure in the Ethics
PART II. Emotion-Types
Anger (orgē)
Some Other (Putative) Links between Emotions and Desires
Appetite (Epithumia)
PART III. THE MATERIAL DIMENSION OF EMOTIONS AND SOME PROBLEMATIC CASES
The Material or Bodily Dimension of Emotions
Some Problematic Cases and the Supplements in the EE Specification of the Emotions
PART IV. FURTHER PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND A SIGNIFICANT PHILOSOPHICAL ADVANTAGE
Contrast with a Contemporary Motivational Theory. Which Representational Role(s) Do Emotions Play?
Explaining Recalcitrant Emotions with Aristotle
Catalogue of Aristotle's Emotions as Representational Pleasures or Distresses
