A Game-Theoretic Perspective on Coalition Formation
Series: Lipsey Lectures;
- Publisher's listprice GBP 80.00
-
36 120 Ft (34 400 Ft + 5% VAT)
The price is estimated because at the time of ordering we do not know what conversion rates will apply to HUF / product currency when the book arrives. In case HUF is weaker, the price increases slightly, in case HUF is stronger, the price goes lower slightly.
- Discount 10% (cc. 3 612 Ft off)
- Discounted price 32 508 Ft (30 960 Ft + 5% VAT)
Subcribe now and take benefit of a favourable price.
Subscribe
36 120 Ft
Availability
printed on demand
Why don't you give exact delivery time?
Delivery time is estimated on our previous experiences. We give estimations only, because we order from outside Hungary, and the delivery time mainly depends on how quickly the publisher supplies the book. Faster or slower deliveries both happen, but we do our best to supply as quickly as possible.
Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 1 November 2007
- ISBN 9780199207954
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages336 pages
- Size 242x163x24 mm
- Weight 655 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements.
MoreLong description:
This is an open access title available under the terms of a CC BY-NC-ND 4.0 International licence. It is free to read at Oxford Scholarship Online and offered as a free PDF download from OUP and selected open access locations.
The formation of coalitions to achieve both collaborative and competitive goals is a phenomenon we see all around us. The list is long and varied: production cartels, political lobbies, customs unions, environmental coalitions, and ethnic alliances are just a few everyday instances. Drawing upon and extending his inaugural Lipsey Lectures at the University of Essex, Debraj Ray looks at coalition formation from the perspective of game theory. How are agreements determined? Which coalitions will form? And are such agreements invariably efficient from a social perspective?
Ray brings together developments in both cooperative and noncooperative game theory to study the analytics of coalition formation and binding agreements. This book concentrates on pure theory, but discusses several potential applications, such as oligopoly and the provision of public goods.
beautifully written should be required reading for any young economic theorist
Table of Contents:
Preface
Introduction
Part 1 The Setting
Ingredients for a Theory of Agreements
Coalitions, Cooperation, and Non-Cooperation
Part 2 The Bargaining Approach to Coalitions Formation
Irreversible Agreements
Irreversible Agreements: Symmetric Games
Applications
Irreversible Agreements: The General Case
A Framework for Reversible Commitments
Reversible Agreements Without Externalities
Reversible Agreements With Externalities
Part 3 A Blocking Approach to Coalition Formation
Blocking
Irreversible Commitments
The Blocking Approach in Real Time
Directions
