A 'Blended System' of Judicial Review in Germany
The Use of Weak-Form Methods Within a Strong-Form Review System
Series: Rechtsvergleichung und Rechtsvereinheitlichung; 105;
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Product details:
- Edition number 1
- Publisher Mohr Siebeck
- Date of Publication 27 August 2025
- ISBN 9783161646652
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages383 pages
- Size 232x155x11 mm
- Weight 148 g
- Language English 682
Categories
Short description:
Die Grundrechte des Grundgesetzes können von verschiedenen Staatsorganen unterschiedlich, jedoch gleichermaßen vertretbar ausgelegt werden. Lisa Rabeneick vertritt die Auffassung, dass das Bundesverfassungsgericht zuweilen 'Weak-Form Judicial Review' ausüben und davon absehen sollte, seine Grundrechtsauslegung an die Stelle derer des Parlaments zu setzen, wenn dessen Verständnis gleichermaßen plausibel ist. Different state actors can reasonably disagree about what guaranteed rights mean. Lisa Rabeneick argues that the German Federal Constitutional Court should, at times, exercise weak-form judicial review and defer in its decision-making to the legislative rights understanding, which may be equally reasonable.
MoreLong description:
Die Grundrechte des Grundgesetzes können von verschiedenen Staatsorganen unterschiedlich, jedoch gleichermaßen vertretbar ausgelegt werden. Lisa Rabeneick vertritt die Auffassung, dass das Bundesverfassungsgericht zuweilen 'Weak-Form Judicial Review' ausüben und davon absehen sollte, seine Grundrechtsauslegung an die Stelle derer des Parlaments zu setzen, wenn dessen Verständnis gleichermaßen plausibel ist. Weak-form judicial review suggests that empowering courts to exercise rights-based judicial review does not necessarily mean that courts can assert their understanding of guaranteed rights or, where they do - as in Germany - that they always should. Instead, they could be constitutionally required to defer, at times, to another state organ's reasonable rights interpretation. Lisa Rabeneick examines this particular aspect of the broader question of how the German Federal Constitutional Court should exercise its powers of strong-form rights-based judicial review in relation to the Federal Parliament. Specifically, she proposes creating a 'blended system' of reviewing legislation under the Basic Law; to be achieved by the court implementing weak-form review in instances in which it should refrain from asserting its rights understanding in relation to the legislature.
MoreTable of Contents:
A. Introduction
I. Proposal of a ‘blended system’ of judicial review - II. Argument for a ‘blended system’ of rights-based judicial review of federal legislation within the German constitutional order
B. An alternative form of judicial review within the German constitutional order
I. Weak-form judicial review and the related international debate -II. Meaning of ‘weak-form and strong-form judicial review’
C. The German strong-form system of rights-based judicial review of legislation
I. Historical decision for a system of constitutional judicial review - II. Existing constitutional design mechanism providing for the court’s strong-form review powers - III. Conclusion and outlook
D. Towards weak-form judicial review in Germany
I. Proposal of a ‘blended system’ of judicial review within the German constitutional order review - II. Absence of weak-form judicial review ideas in Germany - III. Placing the proposal within the German constitutional debate - IV. Concluding observations: Proposal of a blended system within the German constitutional order
E. Benefits of a blended system of rights-based judicial review of legislation within the German constitutional order
I. Previously identified benefits - II. Creating a more appropriate constitutional balance between constitutional principles conflicting in the shape of the court’s strong-form review powers - III. Additional outcome-related constitutional benefits - IV. Conclusion
F. Implementing the proposed blended system on the institutional level
I. Preliminary considerations - II. Defining constitutional constraints - III. Existing room within key constitutional constraints for other forms of weak-form judicial review - IV. Outlook: Additional conversation on the appropriateness of weak-form review
G. Conclusion
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