A termék adatai:
| ISBN13: | 9781350297616 |
| ISBN10: | 1350297615 |
| Kötéstípus: | Puhakötés |
| Terjedelem: | 264 oldal |
| Méret: | 234x156 mm |
| Nyelv: | angol |
| 700 |
Témakör:
The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism
Neuroethics and Seeming States
Kiadó: Bloomsbury Academic
Megjelenés dátuma: 2024. június 27.
Kötetek száma: Paperback
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Kiadói listaár:
GBP 28.99
GBP 28.99
Az Ön ára:
12 182 (11 601 Ft + 5% áfa )
Kedvezmény(ek): 13% (kb. 1 820 Ft)
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Hosszú leírás:
Covering moral intuition, self-evidence, non-inferentiality, moral emotion and seeming states, Hossein Dabbagh defends the epistemology of moral intuitionism.
His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the most tenable one. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment. The book culminates in a convincing argument about the value of understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming and perceptual experience.
His line of analysis resists the empirical challenges derived from empirical moral psychology and reveals the seeming-based account of moral intuitionism as the most tenable one. The Moral Epistemology of Intuitionism combines epistemological intuitionism with work in neuroethics to develop an account of the role that moral intuition and emotion play in moral judgment. The book culminates in a convincing argument about the value of understanding moral intuitionism in terms of intellectual seeming and perceptual experience.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Part I: Mind
1. Philosophical Intuition's Mental Ontology
2. Moral Intuition's Mental Ontology: Shifting from Philosophical to Moral Intuition
3. The Use of Intuition as Evidence
Part II: Epistemology
4. Shaping Classic Moral Intuitionism: An Examination of H. A. Prichard's and W. D. Ross's Ideas
5. Towards the New Moderate Intuitionism: Recent Revivals of Contemporary Moral Intuitionism
Part III: Neuroethics
6. Scepticism about Moral Intuition: How My Favoured Account of Intuition Rebuts the Neuroethicists' Position
7. Scepticism about Moral Intuitionism: How My Favoured Account of Epistemological Intuitionism Rebuts Sinnott-Armstrong's Position
Afterword
Notes
Bibliography
Index
Introduction
Part I: Mind
1. Philosophical Intuition's Mental Ontology
2. Moral Intuition's Mental Ontology: Shifting from Philosophical to Moral Intuition
3. The Use of Intuition as Evidence
Part II: Epistemology
4. Shaping Classic Moral Intuitionism: An Examination of H. A. Prichard's and W. D. Ross's Ideas
5. Towards the New Moderate Intuitionism: Recent Revivals of Contemporary Moral Intuitionism
Part III: Neuroethics
6. Scepticism about Moral Intuition: How My Favoured Account of Intuition Rebuts the Neuroethicists' Position
7. Scepticism about Moral Intuitionism: How My Favoured Account of Epistemological Intuitionism Rebuts Sinnott-Armstrong's Position
Afterword
Notes
Bibliography
Index
