A termék adatai:
| ISBN13: | 9781350344747 |
| ISBN10: | 1350344745 |
| Kötéstípus: | Keménykötés |
| Terjedelem: | 288 oldal |
| Méret: | 234x156 mm |
| Nyelv: | angol |
| 700 |
Témakör:
Stephen Hetherington on Epistemology
Knowing, More or Less
Kiadó: Bloomsbury Academic
Megjelenés dátuma: 2024. május 16.
Kötetek száma: Hardback
Normál ár:
Kiadói listaár:
GBP 85.00
GBP 85.00
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Kedvezmény(ek): 13% (kb. 5 337 Ft)
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Hosszú leírás:
Philosophy has long embraced epistemology as one of its central elements. What is knowledge? How do we gain it? Can we gain it? Or do we always deceive ourselves when thinking that we have knowledge? Are we too deeply fallible ever to know something? For centuries, these questions have helped to define and motivate epistemological research. This volume engages strikingly with them, offering some unusual answers.
Stephen Hetherington's prominent career within epistemology has been a series of bold, varied and provocative arguments and ideas. Bringing together some elements of his unique body of writing for the first time, this collection features previously published as well as new material displaying and extending some of his highly original approaches to key issues including knowledge, justification, fallibility, scepticism and the Gettier Problem.
Advancing our understanding of the systemic nature of Hetherington's thinking, Stephen Hetherington on Epistemology presents his distinctive perspective on some of philosophy's central questions about knowledge - an inviting blend of forensic detail and 'big picture' proposals.
Philosophy has long embraced epistemology as one of its central elements. What is knowledge? How do we gain it? Can we gain it? Or do we always deceive ourselves when thinking that we have knowledge? Are we too deeply fallible ever to know something? For centuries, these questions have helped to define and motivate epistemological research. This volume engages strikingly with them, offering some unusual answers.
Stephen Hetherington's prominent career within epistemology has been a series of bold, varied and provocative arguments and ideas. Bringing together some elements of his unique body of writing for the first time, this collection features previously published as well as new material displaying and extending some of his highly original approaches to key issues including knowledge, justification, fallibility, scepticism and the Gettier Problem.
Advancing our understanding of the systemic nature of Hetherington's thinking, Stephen Hetherington on Epistemology presents his distinctive perspective on some of philosophy's central questions about knowledge - an inviting blend of forensic detail and 'big picture' proposals.
Stephen Hetherington's prominent career within epistemology has been a series of bold, varied and provocative arguments and ideas. Bringing together some elements of his unique body of writing for the first time, this collection features previously published as well as new material displaying and extending some of his highly original approaches to key issues including knowledge, justification, fallibility, scepticism and the Gettier Problem.
Advancing our understanding of the systemic nature of Hetherington's thinking, Stephen Hetherington on Epistemology presents his distinctive perspective on some of philosophy's central questions about knowledge - an inviting blend of forensic detail and 'big picture' proposals.
Philosophy has long embraced epistemology as one of its central elements. What is knowledge? How do we gain it? Can we gain it? Or do we always deceive ourselves when thinking that we have knowledge? Are we too deeply fallible ever to know something? For centuries, these questions have helped to define and motivate epistemological research. This volume engages strikingly with them, offering some unusual answers.
Stephen Hetherington's prominent career within epistemology has been a series of bold, varied and provocative arguments and ideas. Bringing together some elements of his unique body of writing for the first time, this collection features previously published as well as new material displaying and extending some of his highly original approaches to key issues including knowledge, justification, fallibility, scepticism and the Gettier Problem.
Advancing our understanding of the systemic nature of Hetherington's thinking, Stephen Hetherington on Epistemology presents his distinctive perspective on some of philosophy's central questions about knowledge - an inviting blend of forensic detail and 'big picture' proposals.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Editorial Introduction: Interview with Stephen Hetherington
1. Epistemic Internalism's Dilemma
2. How is Epistemology Even Possible?
3. Elusive Epistemological Justification
4. Gettieristic Scepticism
5. Epistemic Disaster Averted
6. Knowing Imperfectly
7. Sceptical Possibilities? No Worries
8. Knowledge That Works: A Tale of Two Conceptual Models
9. Knowledge as Potential for Action
10. Skeptical Challenges and Knowing Actions
11. Some Fallibilist Knowledge: Questioning Knowledge-Attributions and Open Knowledge
12. The Luck/Knowledge Incompatibility Thesis
13. The Redundancy Problem: From Knowledge-Infallibilism to Knowledge-Minimalism
14. And Next?
Bibliography
Index
1. Epistemic Internalism's Dilemma
2. How is Epistemology Even Possible?
3. Elusive Epistemological Justification
4. Gettieristic Scepticism
5. Epistemic Disaster Averted
6. Knowing Imperfectly
7. Sceptical Possibilities? No Worries
8. Knowledge That Works: A Tale of Two Conceptual Models
9. Knowledge as Potential for Action
10. Skeptical Challenges and Knowing Actions
11. Some Fallibilist Knowledge: Questioning Knowledge-Attributions and Open Knowledge
12. The Luck/Knowledge Incompatibility Thesis
13. The Redundancy Problem: From Knowledge-Infallibilism to Knowledge-Minimalism
14. And Next?
Bibliography
Index
