Oxford Studies in Metaethics Volume 15
Sorozatcím:
Oxford Studies in Metaethics;
15;
Kiadó: OUP Oxford
Megjelenés dátuma: 2020. július 23.
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A termék adatai:
| ISBN13: | 9780198859529 |
| ISBN10: | 019885952X |
| Kötéstípus: | Puhakötés |
| Terjedelem: | 368 oldal |
| Méret: | 215x140x20 mm |
| Nyelv: | angol |
| 231 |
Témakör:
Rövid leírás:
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field.
Hosszú leírás:
Oxford Studies in Metaethics is the only publication devoted exclusively to original philosophical work in the foundations of ethics. It provides an annual selection of much of the best new scholarship being done in the field. Its broad purview includes work being done at the intersections of ethical theory with metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The essays included in the series provide an excellent basis for understanding recent developments in the field; those who would like to acquaint themselves with the current state of play in metaethics would do well to start here.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Reason and Respect
The Phenomenal Appreciation of Reasons (Or: How not to be a Psychopath)
Who's on First?
Excuse Without Exculpation: The Case of Moral Ignorance
Resisting Reductive Realism
Moral Realism and Philosophical Angst
Getting a Moral Thing into a Thought: Metasemantics for Non-Naturalists
The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations
Quasi-Dependence
Group Agency Meets Metaethics: How to Craft a More Compelling Form of Normative Relativism
Welfare and Rational Fit
Accommodation to Injustice
The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology
Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments
The Phenomenal Appreciation of Reasons (Or: How not to be a Psychopath)
Who's on First?
Excuse Without Exculpation: The Case of Moral Ignorance
Resisting Reductive Realism
Moral Realism and Philosophical Angst
Getting a Moral Thing into a Thought: Metasemantics for Non-Naturalists
The Metaphysics of Moral Explanations
Quasi-Dependence
Group Agency Meets Metaethics: How to Craft a More Compelling Form of Normative Relativism
Welfare and Rational Fit
Accommodation to Injustice
The Reliability Challenge in Moral Epistemology
Against Minimalist Responses to Moral Debunking Arguments
