Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency

Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency

 
Kiadó: OUP Oxford
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A termék adatai:

ISBN13:9780198873143
ISBN10:019887314X
Kötéstípus:Keménykötés
Terjedelem:416 oldal
Méret:240x165x26 mm
Súly:686 g
Nyelv:angol
626
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Rövid leírás:

Markus Kohl presents a new interpretation and rational reconstruction of Kant's doctrine of freedom. He shows how Kant defends the belief that we are free from both natural and super-natural causes as a presupposition of all meaningful human activity. And Kohl explores the role of freedom in Kant's accounts of morality, cognition, and aesthetics.

Hosszú leírás:
Kant on Freedom and Rational Agency provides a novel interpretation and rational reconstruction of Kant's doctrine of freedom. Markus Kohl shows how Kant defends the belief that we are free from foreign (natural and super-natural) causes as a presupposition of all meaningful human activity. While this interpretation focuses on the essential role that freedom of will plays in our moral agency, it also examines how our status as rational cognitive agents hinges on our freedom of thought, and why our aesthetic engagement with beauty requires our freedom of imagination. Kohl thereby gives a compelling sense of Kant's estimation that freedom is a "cardinal point"--even the "keystone"--of his entire critical philosophy.

Kant's doctrine of freedom emerges in this account as a systematic critique of a naturalistic worldview which regards all our capacities, representations, and actions as the causal upshot of natural laws and forces. Kant holds that the naturalistic worldview fatally undermines our self-conception as rational agents. This critique of naturalism culminates in the argument that naturalistic cognizers cannot explain away our freedom from natural forces because they must presuppose such a freedom in their own cognitive efforts to devise rationally valid naturalistic theories.
Tartalomjegyzék:
Preface and Acknowledgements
Notes on Sources and Key to Abbreviations and Translations
Introduction
Freedom, Idealism, and Standpoints
Human Action as the Effect of Two Causes
Freedom as Autonomous Self-Determination
Legislative Freedom and Kant's Genealogical Anxiety
Executive Freedom, Determinism, and the Categorical Imperative
Transition to Part 3
Kant's Free Thinker
Freedom of Thought as a Condition of Theoretical Cognition
Kant's Moral Grounding of Free Will
Kant's Theoretical Defense of Moral Freedom
Summary and Transition to Part 5
Freedom of Imagination and the "Autonomy of Taste"
Bibliography
Index