The Structure of Regulatory Competition
Corporations and Public Policies in a Global Economy
Series: International Economic Law Series;
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Product details:
- Edition number New ed
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 14 September 2006
- ISBN 9780199216512
- Binding Paperback
- No. of pages336 pages
- Size 234x155x19 mm
- Weight 531 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
In order to understand international economic regulations it is essential to understand the variation in competing corporations' interests. This book's theoretical findings open a 'black box' in the literature on international political economy and elucidate a source of regulatory differences and similarities. Its counter-intuitive case studies reveal how business and governments actually interact. By exploring powerful corporations' investment profiles and regulatory strategies, this book explains why globalization sometimes results in a 'race to the bottom', sometimes in higher common regulations, and sometimes in regulations that differ between countries. Uniquely, it then explains which regulatory outcome is likely to occur under specified conditions. The explanation incorporates economics, political science, studies of regulatory capture, and examinations of transaction costs, firms' regulatory strategies, and the roles international institutions.
MoreLong description:
In order to understand international economic regulations, it is essential to understand the variation in competing corporations' interests. Political science theories have neglected the role of individual firms as causal actors. Theories of institutions have neglected to examine the creation of business law. Economic theories have neglected to apply concepts of asset specificity to social regulations in competitive industries. This book aims to fill these voids with a company-based explanation. Its theoretical findings open a 'black box' in the literature on international political economy and elucidate a source of regulatory differences and similarities.
Counter-intuitive case studies reveal how business and governments actually interact. They also contribute to both sides of current debates over corporate social responsibility. They examine diverse topics including offshore finance, flags-of-convenience, CFC production, capital requirements, the importation and sale of 'dolphin-lethal' tuna, and the advertising of infant formulae.
By exploring powerful corporations' investment profiles and regulatory strategies, this book explains why globalization sometimes results in a 'race to the bottom', sometimes in higher common regulations, and sometimes in regulations that differ between countries. Uniquely, it then explains which regulatory outcome is likely to occur under specified conditions. The explanation incorporates economics, political science, studies of regulatory capture, and examinations of transaction costs, firms' regulatory strategies, and the roles international institutions.
Review from previous edition The Structure of Regulatory Competition indicates how important the strategies of large corporations are for global and national regulatory policy. Norms and ideas sometimes play a role, but to explain outcomes, Dale Murphy reminds us, we have to understand material interests
Table of Contents:
I Introduction
The Puzzle and an Explanation
II Lower Common Denominator
Shipping Flags-of-convenience
Offshore Finance
III Higher Common Denominator
Montreal Protocol on Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs)
Basle Accord on Capital Adequacy
IV Heterogeneity
Mexican Tuna-dolphin
Infant Formula Marketing in the USA
V Conclusion
Evidence and Implications
