Product details:
ISBN13: | 9781108498159 |
ISBN10: | 1108498159 |
Binding: | Hardback |
No. of pages: | 204 pages |
Size: | 234x156x16 mm |
Weight: | 420 g |
Language: | English |
Illustrations: | 12 b/w illus. 34 tables |
135 |
Category:
The Private Sector in Public Office
Selective Property Rights in China
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Date of Publication: 5 September 2019
Normal price:
Publisher's listprice:
GBP 80.00
GBP 80.00
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34 776 (33 120 HUF + 5% VAT )
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Estimated delivery time: In stock at the publisher, but not at Prospero's office. Delivery time approx. 3-5 weeks.
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Short description:
Examines how the private sector in China manages to grow without secure property rights.
Long description:
This book addresses the long-standing puzzle of how China's private sector manages to grow without secure property rights, and proposes a new theory of selective property rights to explain this phenomenon. Drawing on rich empirical evidence including in-depth interviews, a unique national survey of private entrepreneurs, two original national audit experiments and secondary sources, Professor Yue Hou shows that private entrepreneurs in China actively seek opportunities within formal institutions to advance their business interests. By securing seats in the local legislatures, entrepreneurs use their political capital to deter local officials from demanding bribes, ad hoc taxes, and other types of informal payments. In doing so they create a system of selective, individualized, and predictable property rights. This system of selective property rights is key to understanding the private sector growth in the absence of the rule of law.
'In this fascinating and innovative book, Yue Hou breathes new life into the study of private entrepreneurs in China. She shows convincingly that China's entrepreneurs join local legislatures in order to protect their economic interests, not to promote political change.' Bruce Dickson, George Washington University
'In this fascinating and innovative book, Yue Hou breathes new life into the study of private entrepreneurs in China. She shows convincingly that China's entrepreneurs join local legislatures in order to protect their economic interests, not to promote political change.' Bruce Dickson, George Washington University
Table of Contents:
1. Introduction; 2. Selective property rights; 3. Private entrepeneurs in legislative office; 4. Motivations to run; 5. Protection from predation; 6. Legislator status and political capital; 7. Conclusion.