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  • The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1

    The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice, Volume 1 by Congleton, Roger D.; Grofman, Bernard N.; Voigt, Stefan;

    Series: Oxford Handbooks;

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    Product details:

    • Publisher OUP USA
    • Date of Publication 31 January 2019

    • ISBN 9780190469733
    • Binding Hardback
    • No. of pages984 pages
    • Size 249x183x58 mm
    • Weight 1792 g
    • Language English
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    Short description:

    The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems.

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    Long description:

    The Oxford Handbook of Public Choice provides a comprehensive overview of the research in economics, political science, law, and sociology that has generated considerable insight into the politics of democratic and authoritarian systems as well as the influence of different institutional frameworks on incentives and outcomes. The result is an improved understanding of public policy, public finance, industrial organization, and macroeconomics as the combination of political and economic analysis shed light on how various interests compete both within a given rules of the games and, at times, to change the rules. These volumes include analytical surveys, syntheses, and general overviews of the many subfields of public choice focusing on interesting, important, and at times contentious issues. Throughout the focus is on enhancing understanding how political and economic systems act and interact, and how they might be improved.

    Both volumes combine methodological analysis with substantive overviews of key topics. This first volume covers voting and elections; interest group competition and rent seeking, including corruption and various normative approaches to evaluating policies and politics.

    Throughout both volumes important analytical concepts and tools are discussed, including their application to substantive topics. Readers will gain increased understanding of rational choice and its implications for collective action; various explanations of voting, including economic and expressive; the role of taxation and finance in government dynamics; how trust and persuasion influence political outcomes; and how revolution, coups, and authoritarianism can be explained by the same set of analytical tools as enhance understanding of the various forms of democracy.

    The articles are written for serious readers, and they give clear and concise statements of the material they cover... the essays in this Handbook will provide wonderful insights into the present state of public choice.

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    Table of Contents:

    PART I: Introductory Essays
    1. Rational Choice and Politics: An Introduction to the Research Program and Methodology of Public Choice
    Roger D. Congleton
    2. Choosing among Governments
    Alan Hamlin
    3. Public Choice: Early Contributions
    Dennis C. Mueller
    PART II: VOTING AND ELECTIONS
    A. Modelling Collective Choice in Voting
    4. From Paired Comparisons and Cycles to Arrow's Theorem
    Donald G. Saari
    5. Institution-induced Stability
    Kenneth A. Shepsle
    6. Voting Power
    Stefan Napel
    7. Aggregation of Information by Binary Voting Rules
    Shmuel Nitzan and Jacob Paroush
    B. Spatial Voting Models
    8. Political Choices in One Dimension: Theory
    Bernard Grofman
    9. Political Choices in One Dimension: Applications
    Bernard Grofman
    10. Spatial Voting Models of Party Competition in Two Dimensions
    James F. Adams
    11. Spatial Social Choice
    Norman Schofield
    C. Other Aspects of Voter and Party Choice
    12. Economic Voting
    Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Mary Stegmaier
    13. Valence Politics
    Haldun Evrenk
    14. The Study of Strategic Voting
    André Blais and Arianna Degan
    15. Turnout: Why do voters vote?
    Serguei Kaniovski
    16. Expressive Voting
    Alan Hamlin and Colin Jennings
    17. Altruism and Political Participation
    Richard Jankowski
    18. Social Embeddedness and Rational Turnout
    Carole Jean Uhlaner
    19. Information cues and rational ignorance
    Shaun Bowler and Stephen P. Nicholson
    20. Manipulation
    Charles R. Plott
    D. Democracy in Practice
    21. Campaign Finance
    Thomas Stratmann
    22. Primaries, conventions, and other methods for nominating candidates: How do they matter?
    Gilles Serra
    23. Logrolling and Coalitions
    Anthony J. McGann
    PART III: INTEREST GROUP POLITICS AND RENT SEEKING
    A. Interest Group Politics
    24. Collective Action
    Jac C. Heckelman
    25. Rent seeking: The social cost of contestable benefits
    Arye L. Hillman and Ngo Van Long
    26. The Structure of Contests and the Extent of Dissipation
    Karl Wärneryd
    27. The Political Economy of Rent Creation and Rent Extraction
    Roger D. Congleton
    28. Empirical evidence on rent seeking costs
    Ignacio Del Rosal
    B. Political Agency Problems and Trust in Government
    29. 'The Bureaucracy' as an Interest Group
    Patrick Dunleavy
    30. Interest Groups and Regulatory Capture
    William F. Shughart II and Diana W. Thomas
    31. Corruption
    Toke Aidt
    32. The Political Economy of Trust
    Christian Bj?rnskov
    C. Persuasion
    33. Contested Political Persuasion
    Stergios Skaperdas and Samarth Vaidya
    34. Stochastic Process Models of Preference Change
    Michel Regenwetter and Yung-Fong Hsu
    35. Leadership as Persuasion
    Benjamin E. Hermalin
    PART IV: NORMATIVE POLITICAL THEORY: EVALUATING POLICIES AND POLITIES
    36. Fairness Concepts
    Christian Klamler
    37. Social Contract vs. Invisible Hand: Agreeing to Solve Social Dilemmas
    Viktor J. Vanberg
    38. Utilitarianism as a Criterion for State Action
    Nicolaus Tideman and Florenz Plassmann
    39. Public Choice and Happiness
    Bruno Frey and Alois Stutzer
    40. Kantianism and Political Institutions
    Geoffrey Brennan and Hartmut Kliemt
    41. Public choice and libertarianism
    Peter J. Boettke and Ennio E. Piano
    42. Public choice and social democracy
    Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard
    43. Supreme Values, Totalitarianism and Terrorism
    Peter Bernholz
    44. Fair Division in Dispute Resolution
    Steven J. Brams
    45. Fair Division in Allocating Cabinet Ministries
    Steven J. Brams

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