The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP USA
- Date of Publication 17 February 2011
- ISBN 9780195372656
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages268 pages
- Size 157x236x20 mm
- Weight 522 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement provides a comprehensive and succinct treatment of the history, structure, and behavior of the various U.S. institutions that enforce antitrust laws. It also draws comparisons with the structure of institutional enforcement outside the United States, and it considers the possibility of creating international antitrust institutions through the World Trade Organization or other treaty mechanisms. Topics are derived from historical, economic, political, and theoretical perspectives.
MoreLong description:
The Institutional Structure of Antitrust Enforcement, by Daniel A. Crane provides a comprehensive and succinct treatment of the history, structure, and behavior of the various U.S. institutions that enforce antitrust laws, such as the Department of Justice and the Federal Trade Commission. It addresses the relationship between corporate regulation and antitrust, the uniquely American approach of having two federal antitrust agencies, antitrust federalism, and the predominance of private enforcement over public enforcement. It also draws comparisons with the structure of institutional enforcement outside the United States in the European Union and in other parts of the world, and it considers the possibility of creating international antitrust institutions through the World Trade Organization or other treaty mechanisms. The book derives its topics from historical, economic, political, and theoretical perspectives.
MoreTable of Contents:
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Part I - Origins and Development of U.S. Antitrust Institutions
Chapter One: Antifederalism and Corporate Regulation
Chapter Two: The Curious Case of Dual Federal Enforcement
Chapter Three: Private Enforcement: Growth and Backlash
Chapter Four: Shifting Towards Technocracy
Part II - Optimizing Institutional Performance
Chapter Five: Adjudication, Regulation, and Administration
Chapter Six. The Much-Maligned Antitrust Jury
Chapter Seven: Improving Public Enforcement
Chapter Eight: State Enforcement and Federal Preemption
Chapter Nine: Rethinking Private Enforcement
Part III - Comparative and International Perspectives
Chapter Ten: How and Why is Europe Different?
Chapter Eleven: Emerging Antitrust Institutions Around the World
Chapter Twelve: Toward International Antitrust Institutions?
Index