The European Commission's Toleration of Noncompliance with EU Law
A Guardian with Two Faces
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 19 March 2025
- ISBN 9780198921080
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages272 pages
- Size 240x160x20 mm
- Weight 560 g
- Language English 588
Categories
Short description:
This book explores the enforcement of EU law by the European Commission. It draws on four case studies to demonstrate that the Commission's strategic enforcement is not driven by a singular or merely egocentric logic but by different configurations of divergent enforcement incentives.
MoreLong description:
EU law is widely recognized as the backbone of European integration. As 'the Guardian of the Treaties', the European Commission is expected to enforce EU law relentlessly and meticulously. Noncompliance by Member States, however, is not always prosecuted by the supranational guardian; instead, supranational enforcement by the Commission is known to be selective and strategic. In this book, Yaning Zhang argues that such forbearance is driven by divergent enforcement rationales. He assumes that the Commission, when enforcing EU law, is a hybrid institution of a political agent and a judicial trustee. The enforcement incentives of the Commission are to advance its legislative and political agenda and to safeguard the stability of the EU legal order, respectively. When these two incentives interact, it leads to four ideal types of toleration of noncompliance with EU Law by the Commission.
Guided by the proposed typology, the book traces four cases of enforcement leniency concerning restrictive measures against pharmaceutical parallel trade, opaque defence procurement, degrading practices towards irregular migrants, and discriminatory regulation over car tolls. These cases demonstrate that the Commission's strategic enforcement is not driven by a singular or merely egocentric logic but by different configurations of divergent enforcement incentives. Naturally, the normative quality of individual types of forbearance is also rather diverse. With its novel typology and in-depth empirical evidence, The European Commission's Toleration of Noncompliance with EU Law offers a new way of understanding the complex interplay between law and politics in the EU.
Table of Contents:
List of Figures
List of Tables
List of Abbreviations
Introduction
Theorizing Toleration of Noncompliance
Altruistic ToN: Coping with Limits of the EU Legal Order Concerning Pharmaceutical Parallel Trade
Egocentric ToN: Disarming the Czech Republic's Defence Offset Autonomy
Active ToN: Failing Forward towards a Functional Common European Asylum System?
Passive ToN: Overcoming the Domestic Political Crisis over the German Road Charge Scheme
Conclusion: Assessing the Typology and Evidence of ToN
Appendix
Bibliography
Index
