Rethinking the Good
Moral Ideals and the Nature of Practical Reasoning
Series: Oxford Ethics Series;
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP USA
- Date of Publication 16 February 2012
- ISBN 9780199759446
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages640 pages
- Size 165x239x50 mm
- Weight 967 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
In choosing between moral alternatives -- choosing between various forms of ethical action -- we typically make calculations of the following kind, using the principle of transitivity : A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. Larry Temkin shows is that if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions.
MoreLong description:
In choosing between moral alternatives -- choosing between various forms of ethical action -- we typically make calculations of the following kind: A is better than B; B is better than C; therefore A is better than C. These inferences use the principle of transitivity and are fundamental to many forms of practical and theoretical theorizing, not just in moral and ethical theory but in economics. Indeed they are so common as to be almost invisible. What Larry Temkin's book shows is that, shockingly, if we want to continue making plausible judgments, we cannot continue to make these assumptions.
Temkin shows that we are committed to various moral ideals that are, surprisingly, fundamentally incompatible with the idea that "better than" can be transitive. His book develops many examples where value judgments that we accept and find attractive, are incompatible with transitivity. While this might seem to leave two options -- reject transitivity, or reject some of our normative commitments in order to keep it -- Temkin is neutral on which path to follow, only making the case that a choice is necessary, and that the cost either way will be high. Temkin's book is a very original and deeply unsettling work of skeptical philosophy that mounts an important new challenge to contemporary ethics.
This book is about some of the most profound issues in human life, including our own good, and how to weigh the good of one person against that of others. Its conclusions have significant implications for the very possibility of practical rationality, and its challenging and sophisticated arguments will be sources of insight and inspiration for anyone who reflects on them.
Table of Contents:
1. Introduction
2. Aggregation and Problems about Trade-offs: Many-Person Spectrum
3. A "New" Principle of Aggregation
4. On the Separateness of Individuals, Compensation, and Aggregation
5. Aggregation and Problems about Trade-offs Within Lives: Single- Person Spectrum Arguments
6. Another Spectrum Argument: From Infant to Fertilized Ovum
7. Exploring Transitivity: Part I
8. Exploring Transitivity: Part II
9. Expected Utility Theory/Expected Value Theory
10. Spectrum Arguments: Objections and Replies
11. On the Value of Utility and Two Models for Combining Ideals
12. On the Nature of Moral Ideals, Part I
13. On the Nature of Moral Ideals, Part II
14. Juggling to Preserve Transitivity
15. Conclusion
Appendices
Notes
Bibliography
Index
