Property Taxes and State Incapacity in Pakistan
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Pakistan
- Date of Publication 17 October 2022
- ISBN 9780190702557
- Binding Paperback
- No. of pages246 pages
- Size 216x138x12 mm
- Weight 272 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
This book shows how Pakistan's inability to collect taxes reflects a broader disconnection between the state and its citizens, which translates into growing fiscal deficits, poor service delivery, increasing socio economic inequalities and low democratic accountability. Through extensive primary fieldwork, which included original interviews with tax bureaucrats and policymakers, detailed archival work and analysis of tax collection, Mujtaba Piracha truly shows how property taxation is a grudging political bargain, a permanent dispute or a strategic collusion between local wealthy taxpayers, intermediate tax collectors, and tax authorities, to minimize their duties and raid the fiscal commons.
MoreLong description:
Property taxes are considered progressive and a good way of directly taxing the rich to pay for social services for all at the local level. But they tend to be under-used globally, especially in developing countries. This book offers some explanations on why property tax collection is exceptionally low in the Punjab. In doing so, it delves into the politics of decentralization and yet another failed attempt to establish viable local governments during the era of President Musharraf. Based on original research and the author's long experience in the civil service, the book brings out the motivations of politicians and bureaucrats at the various levels of government, the interplay and frictions within the various tiers of the tax department, as well as the interaction between the tax collectors and the taxpayers. It finds that dysfunction at multiple levels exists for good reasons and perhaps even by design. The book is insightful on issues of tax policy and administration; intergovernmental fiscal relationships; perverse incentives for subnational governments to raid the fiscal commons than raise own tax revenues; weak institutional capacities; non-existent fiscal contract between the state and citizens and the missing loop of political accountability; working of street-level bureaucrats, etc. Any reform initiative, be it of a certain tax, an institution, or of the wider governance structure, cannot move forward meaningfully without understanding the underlying reasons of why things are the way they are, in the first place.
MoreTable of Contents:
List of Figures and Tables
Abbreviations
Preface
Why is Property Tax in the Punjab so Low?
- The Pakistani State is Not a Good Taxer
- Property Taxes are Good Taxes but Hard to Collect
- Investigating the Puzzle
- Findings and Chapter Outlines
A Cooperation Problem: Property Tax and Inter-governmental Politics
- Why Money Incentives are Not Enough
- Bureaucratic Interests Impede Property Tax Collection
- Inter-governmental Politics and Property Tax Collection
- Conclusion
Low Fiscal Equilibrium: Income and Liquidity of Subnational Governments
- From Where do Subnational Governments get Their Money?
- Do Intergovernmental Transfers Discourage Tax Collection?
- Effects of Subnational Government Sources of Income on Their Own Tax Effort
- Do Subnational Governments even need the Extra Money?
- Conclusion
Low Fiscal Equilibrium: Lack of Political Incentives to Spend on Public Services
- Why is Public Service Delivery so Bad?
- Service Delivery to the Poor is a Low Priority for the Government
- Civil Servants are Happy with their Perks and Privileges
- Donors Do Not Want to Upset the Apple Cart
- Conclusion
The Informality of Formal Tax Collection
- Property Tax Administration in the Punjab
- Tax Collection at the Local Level
- An Office Meeting, Target-setting, and Managing Information
- Conclusion
Enforcement: The Mirage of Change
- Enforcement in the Last Quarter
- How Supervisors Ensure Enforcement
- Civil Courts Impede Enforcement
- Persistent Informality
- Dealing with Various Types of Tax Defaulters
- Conclusion
So, What Can Be Done?
- First, a Summary of the Arguments
- Do Incentives to Tax Collectors Really Work?
- Can Information Technology Help Increase Tax Collection?
- Policy Implications for Tax Reforms in Pakistan
- Some Broader Implications
Notes
Bibliography
Acknowledgements
Index
