Moral Realism
A Defence
- Publisher's listprice GBP 165.00
-
78 828 Ft (75 075 Ft + 5% VAT)
The price is estimated because at the time of ordering we do not know what conversion rates will apply to HUF / product currency when the book arrives. In case HUF is weaker, the price increases slightly, in case HUF is stronger, the price goes lower slightly.
- Discount 10% (cc. 7 883 Ft off)
- Discounted price 70 946 Ft (67 568 Ft + 5% VAT)
Subcribe now and take benefit of a favourable price.
Subscribe
78 828 Ft
Availability
printed on demand
Why don't you give exact delivery time?
Delivery time is estimated on our previous experiences. We give estimations only, because we order from outside Hungary, and the delivery time mainly depends on how quickly the publisher supplies the book. Faster or slower deliveries both happen, but we do our best to supply as quickly as possible.
Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 19 June 2003
- ISBN 9780199259755
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages332 pages
- Size 242x163x23 mm
- Weight 640 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. His central thesis, as well as the many novel supporting arguments used to defend it, will spark much controversy among those concerned with the foundations of ethics.
MoreLong description:
Moral Realism is a systematic defence of the idea that there are objective moral standards. In the tradition of Plato and G. E. Moore, Russ Shafer-Landau argues that there are moral principles that are true independently of what anyone, anywhere, happens to think of them. These principles are a fundamental aspect of reality, just as much as those that govern mathematics or the natural world. They may be true regardless of our ability to grasp them, and their truth is not a matter of their being ratified from any ideal standpoint, nor of being the object of actual or hypothetical consensus, nor of being an expression of our rational nature.
Shafer-Landau accepts Plato's and Moore's contention that moral truths are sui generis. He rejects the currently popular efforts to conceive of ethics as a kind of science, and insists that moral truths and properties occupy a distinctive area in our ontology. Unlike scientific truths, the fundamental moral principles are knowable a priori. And unlike mathematical truths, they are essentially normative: intrinsically action-guiding, and supplying a justification for all who follow their counsel.
Moral Realism is the first comprehensive treatise defending non-naturalistic moral realism in over a generation. It ranges over all of the central issues in contemporary metaethics, and will be an important source of discussion for philosophers and their students interested in issues concerning the foundations of ethics.
Moral Realism: A Defense is highly accessible, and Shafer-Landau does a remarkable job of navigating difficult arguments in the domain of meta-ethics and of metaphysics and epistemology. It is an excellent text to include in upper-level undergraduate courses in meta-ethics as well as in graduate seminars.
Table of Contents:
I. REALISM AND ITS CRITICS
The Non-cognitivist Challenge
The Constructivist Challenge
II. MORAL METAPHYSICS
Ethical Non-naturalism
Supervenience and Causation
III. MORAL MOTIVATION
Motivational Humeanism
Motivational Judgement Internalism
IV. MORAL REASONS
Reasons Internalism
Moral Rationalism
Rationality and Disagreement
V. MORAL KNOWLEDGE
Moral Scepticism
The Justification of Moral Principles
The Justification of Verdictive Beliefs
References
Index
