Inventing the Schlieffen Plan
German War Planning 1871-1914
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 31 October 2002
- ISBN 9780199250165
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages356 pages
- Size 242x162x24 mm
- Weight 645 g
- Language English
- Illustrations numerous maps 0
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Short description:
The existence of the Schlieffen plan has been one of the basic assumptions of twentieth-century military history. It was the perfect example of the evils of German militarism: aggressive, mechanical, disdainful of politics and of public morality. Terence Zuber challenges this orthodox view to present a radically different picture of German war planning between 1871 and 1914, and concludes that, in fact, there never really was a `Schlieffen plan'.
MoreLong description:
The existence of the Schlieffen plan has been one of the basic assumptions of twentieth-century military history. It was the perfect example of the evils of German militarism: aggressive, mechanical, disdainful of politics and of public morality. The Great War began in August 1914 allegedly because the Schlieffen plan forced the German government to transform a Balkan quarrel into a World War by attacking France. And, in the end, the Schlieffen plan failed at the battle of the Marne.
Yet it has always been recognized that the Schlieffen plan included inconsistencies which have never been satisfactorily explained. On the basis of newly discovered documents from German archives, Terence Zuber presents a radically different picture of German war planning between 1871 and 1914, and concludes that, in fact, there never really was a `Schlieffen plan'.
Zuber's scholarly work will play an important role in the continuing debates on military planning and on its relationship to the coming of World War One.
Table of Contents:
Inventing the Schlieffen plan
Moltke's Ostaufmarsch, 1871-1886
Fortresses, spies, and crisis, 1886-1890
Schlieffen's war plan, 1891-1905
Moltke's war plan, 1906-1914
Excuses and accusations