In Place of Inter-State Retaliation
The European Union's Rejection of WTO-style Trade Sanctions and Trade Remedies
- Publisher's listprice GBP 105.00
-
50 163 Ft (47 775 Ft + 5% VAT)
The price is estimated because at the time of ordering we do not know what conversion rates will apply to HUF / product currency when the book arrives. In case HUF is weaker, the price increases slightly, in case HUF is stronger, the price goes lower slightly.
- Discount 10% (cc. 5 016 Ft off)
- Discounted price 45 147 Ft (42 998 Ft + 5% VAT)
Subcribe now and take benefit of a favourable price.
Subscribe
50 163 Ft
Availability
printed on demand
Why don't you give exact delivery time?
Delivery time is estimated on our previous experiences. We give estimations only, because we order from outside Hungary, and the delivery time mainly depends on how quickly the publisher supplies the book. Faster or slower deliveries both happen, but we do our best to supply as quickly as possible.
Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 18 December 2014
- ISBN 9780198712794
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages218 pages
- Size 236x162x18 mm
- Weight 488 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
This book suggests a new explanation of the European Union's legal system, emphasising its break with the inter-state retaliation mechanisms and how Europe's special form of legal integration is facilitated by intra-industry trade, parliamentary forms of national government, and European welfare states.
MoreLong description:
Unlike many other trade regimes, the European Union forbids the use of inter-state retaliation to enforce its obligations, and rules out the use of common 'escape' mechanisms such as anti-dumping between the EU member states. How does the EU do without these mechanisms that appear so vital to the political viability of other international trade regimes, including the World Trade Organization? How, therefore, is the European legal order, with the European Court of Justice at its centre, able to be so much more binding and intrusive than the legal obligations of many other trade regimes?
This book puts forward a new explanation of a key part of the European Union's legal system, emphasising its break with the inter-state retaliation mechanisms and how Europe's special form of legal integration is facilitated by intra-industry trade, parliamentary forms of national government, and European welfare states.
It argues first that the EU member states have allowed the enforcement of EU obligations by domestic courts in order to avoid the problems associated with enforcing trade obligations by constant threats of trade retaliation. It argues second that the EU member states have been able to accept such a binding form of dispute settlement and treaty obligation because the policy adjustments required by the European legal order were politically acceptable. High levels of intra-industry trade reduced the severity of the economic adjustments required by the expansion of the European market, and inclusive and authoritative democratic institutions in the member states allowed policy-makers to prioritise a general interest in reliable trading relationships even when policy changes affected significant domestic lobbies. Furthermore, generous national social security arrangements protected national constituents against any adverse consequences arising from the expansion of European law and the intensification of the European market.
The European legal order should therefore be understood as a legalized dispute resolution institution well suited to an international trade and integration regime made up of highly interdependent parliamentary welfare states.
This slim book does something difficult. Like a previous and somewhat dated literature, William Phelan's study analyzes a sui generis feature of the EU, but it studies this 'unidentified political object' in terms of a well-established International Relations literature on international regimes and legal interpretations on constitutionalization Phelan addresses the inherent problem of explaining a singular feature of the EU with a comparative analysis between WTO and other trade agreements Brexit has made Phelan's book an extremely topical study.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
The Puzzle
The European Legal Order
Enforcement and Escape in International Trade Politics
Explaining the EU's Rejection of Inter-State Trade Sanctions and Trade Remedies: Analysis
Explaining the EU's Rejection of Inter-State Trade Sanctions and Trade Remedies: Narrative
Conclusion
