From a Rational Point of View
How We Represent Subjective Perspectives in Practical Discourse
- Publisher's listprice GBP 82.00
-
39 175 Ft (37 310 Ft + 5% VAT)
The price is estimated because at the time of ordering we do not know what conversion rates will apply to HUF / product currency when the book arrives. In case HUF is weaker, the price increases slightly, in case HUF is stronger, the price goes lower slightly.
- Discount 10% (cc. 3 918 Ft off)
- Discounted price 35 258 Ft (33 579 Ft + 5% VAT)
Subcribe now and take benefit of a favourable price.
Subscribe
39 175 Ft
Availability
Estimated delivery time: In stock at the publisher, but not at Prospero's office. Delivery time approx. 3-5 weeks.
Not in stock at Prospero.
Why don't you give exact delivery time?
Delivery time is estimated on our previous experiences. We give estimations only, because we order from outside Hungary, and the delivery time mainly depends on how quickly the publisher supplies the book. Faster or slower deliveries both happen, but we do our best to supply as quickly as possible.
Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 5 June 2018
- ISBN 9780198797036
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages252 pages
- Size 237x164x20 mm
- Weight 542 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
Tim Henning applies insights from the philosophy of language and formal semantics to problems in practical philosophy, and solves notorious puzzles about the reasons we have, what it is rational for us to do, and what we ought to do. He offers a more unified understanding of normative and practical discourse.
MoreLong description:
When discussing normative reasons, oughts, requirements of rationality, motivating reasons, and so on, we often have to use verbs like "believe" and "want" to capture a relevant subject's perspective. According to the received view about sentences involving these verbs, what they do is describe the subject's mental states. Many puzzles concerning normative discourse have to do with the role that mental states consequently appear to play in normative discourse.
Tim Henning uses tools from semantics and the philosophy of language to develop an alternative account of sentences involving these verbs. According to this view, which is called parentheticalism, we very commonly use these verbs in a parenthetical sense. These verbs themselves express backgrounded side-remarks on the contents they embed, and these latter, embedded contents constitute the at-issue contents. This means that instead of speaking about the subject's mental states, we often use sentences involving "believe" and "want" to speak about the world from her point of view. Henning makes this notion precise, and uses it to solve various puzzles concerning normative discourse. The final result is a new, unified understanding of normative discourse, which gets by without postulating conceptual breaks between objective and subjective normative reasons, or normative reasons and rationality, or indeed between the reasons we ascribe to an agent and the reasons she herself can be expected to cite. Instead of being connected to either subjective mental states or objective facts, all of these normative statuses are can be adequately articulated by citing worldly considerations from a subject's point of view.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
Parentheticalism about "believe"
Parentheticalism about "want"
Parentheticalism and Normative Reasons
Parentheticalism, Normative Reasons, and Error Cases
Parentheticalism and Requirements of Rationality
Parentheticalism and Action Explanation
Parentheticalism and (Ir)rational Agency
Epilogue
