Corruption and the Voter's Decision
Experimental Evidence from Brazil
Series: Elements in Law, Economics and Politics;
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Product details:
- Publisher Cambridge University Press
- Date of Publication 3 April 2025
- ISBN 9781009499767
- Binding Paperback
- No. of pages66 pages
- Size 228x151x4 mm
- Weight 120 g
- Language English 711
Categories
Short description:
This Element offers a framework to understand the factors that influence voter decisions, promoting greater electoral accountability.
MoreLong description:
Despite voters' distaste for corruption, corrupt politicians frequently get reelected. This Element provides a framework for understanding when corrupt politicians are reelected. One unexplored source of electoral accountability is court rulings on candidate malfeasance, which are increasingly determining politicians' electoral prospects. The findings suggest that (1) low-income voters - in contrast to higher-income voters - are responsive to such rulings. Unlike earlier studies, we explore multiple trade-offs voters weigh when confronting corrupt candidates, including the candidate's party, policy positions, and personal attributes. The results also surprisingly show (2) low-income voters, like higher-income voters, weigh corruption allegations and policy positions similarly, and are slightly more responsive to candidate attributes. Moreover, irrespective of voter income, (3) party labels insulate candidates from corruption, and (4) candidate attributes like gender have little effect. The results have implications for when voters punish corrupt politicians, the success of anti-corruption campaigns, and the design and legitimacy of electoral institutions.
MoreTable of Contents:
1. Introduction; 2. Electoral accountability and public opinion; 3. A Framework for analyzing candidate corruption and voting behavior; 4. Corruption and the voter's decision: evidence from a conjoint experiment; 5. Conclusion; References.
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