Changes of Mind
An Essay on Rational Belief Revision
- Publisher's listprice GBP 142.50
-
68 079 Ft (64 837 Ft + 5% VAT)
The price is estimated because at the time of ordering we do not know what conversion rates will apply to HUF / product currency when the book arrives. In case HUF is weaker, the price increases slightly, in case HUF is stronger, the price goes lower slightly.
- Discount 10% (cc. 6 808 Ft off)
- Discounted price 61 271 Ft (58 353 Ft + 5% VAT)
Subcribe now and take benefit of a favourable price.
Subscribe
68 079 Ft
Availability
printed on demand
Why don't you give exact delivery time?
Delivery time is estimated on our previous experiences. We give estimations only, because we order from outside Hungary, and the delivery time mainly depends on how quickly the publisher supplies the book. Faster or slower deliveries both happen, but we do our best to supply as quickly as possible.
Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 14 June 2012
- ISBN 9780199655755
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages364 pages
- Size 242x164x27 mm
- Weight 716 g
- Language English
- Illustrations 135 b/w line illustrations 0
Categories
Short description:
An account of how a rational agent should revise beliefs in the light of new evidence. This theory is set apart from previous belief revision theories by being computationally implementable, provides rigorous mathematical theory of dependency networks and formulates and investigates the complexity of algorithms for rational agents revising beliefs.
MoreLong description:
This is the first logically precise, computationally implementable, book-length account of rational belief revision. It explains how a rational agent ought to proceed when adopting a new belief - a difficult matter if the new belief contradicts the agent's old beliefs.
Belief systems are modeled as finite dependency networks. So one can attend not only to what the agent believes, but also to the variety of reasons the agent has for so believing. The computational complexity of the revision problem is characterized. Algorithms for belief revision are formulated, and implemented in Prolog. The implementation tests well on a range of simple belief-revision problems that pose a variety of challenges for any account of belief revision.
The notion of 'minimal mutilation' of a belief system is explicated precisely for situations when the agent is faced with conflicting beliefs. The proposed revision methods are invariant across different global justificatory structures (foundationalist, coherentist, etc.). They respect the intuition that, when revising one's beliefs, one should not hold on to any belief that has lost all its former justifications. The limitation to finite dependency networks is shown not to compromise theoretical generality.
This account affords a novel way to argue that there is an inviolable core of logical principles. These principles, which form the system of Core Logic, cannot be given up, on pain of not being able to carry out the reasoning involved in rationally revising beliefs.
The book ends by comparing and contrasting the new account with some major representatives of earlier alternative approaches, from the fields of formal epistemology, artificial intelligence and mathematical logic.
Rich in helpful and elegant diagrams, accurate index and quite extensive bibliography, the monograph guides the reader through the maze of philosophical issues and logical concepts in a clear and efficient way. At places the narrative unexpectedly changes focus from mathematical definitions to philosophical considerations, from in-depth analysis to broad general perspectives. This feature makes the book a challenging and entertaining read.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
Part I: Computational Considerations
Computing Changes in Belief
Global Conditions on Contraction
A Formal Theory of Contraction
Specification of a Contraction Algorithm
A Prolog Program for Contraction
Results of Running our Program for Contraction
Part II: Logical and Philosophical Considerations
Core Logic is the Inviolable Core of Logic
The Finitary Predicament
Mathematical Justifications are Not Infinitely Various
Part III: Comparisons
Differences with Other Formal Theories
Connections with Various Epistemological Accounts
