Bureaucracies at War
The Institutional Origins of Miscalculation
Series: Cambridge Studies in International Relations;
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15 177 Ft
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Product details:
- Publisher Cambridge University Press
- Date of Publication 27 June 2024
- ISBN 9781009307222
- Binding Paperback
- No. of pages408 pages
- Size 228x150x21 mm
- Weight 590 g
- Language English 1024
Categories
Short description:
Rethinks how bureaucracy shapes foreign policy - miscalculation is less likely when political leaders can extract quality information from the bureaucracy.
MoreLong description:
Why do states start conflicts they ultimately lose? Why do leaders possess inaccurate expectations of their prospects for victory? Bureaucracies at War examines how national security institutions shape the quality of bureaucratic information upon which leaders base their choice for conflict - which institutional designs provide the best counsel, why those institutions perform better, and why many leaders fail to adopt them. Jost argues that the same institutions that provide the best information also empower the bureaucracy to punish the leader. Thus, miscalculation on the road to war is often the tragic consequence of how leaders resolve the trade-off between good information and political security. Employing an original cross-national data set and detailed explorations of the origins and consequences of institutions inside China, India, Pakistan, and the United States, this book explores why bureaucracy helps to avoid disaster, how bureaucratic competition produces better information, and why institutional design is fundamentally political.
'An illuminating exploration of the role national security institutions play in international decision-making - both good and bad.' Graham Allison, Douglas Dillon Professor of Government, Harvard University, and author of Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides Trap?
Table of Contents:
1. Introduction; 2. An institutional theory of miscalculation; 3. The world of national security institutions; 4. China under Mao; 5. China after Mao; 6. India; 7. Pakistan; 8. The United States during the Early Cold War; 9. Conclusion; Appendix A: National security institutions data set; Appendix B: Archival and interview data collection.
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Bureaucracies at War: The Institutional Origins of Miscalculation
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