Bargaining on Nuclear Tests
Washington and its Cold War Deals
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Product details:
- Publisher OUP Oxford
- Date of Publication 1 May 2014
- ISBN 9780198702931
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages246 pages
- Size 239x163x22 mm
- Weight 534 g
- Language English 0
Categories
Short description:
Bargaining on Nuclear Tests tells the yet untold story of how Washington under Ronald Reagan's presidency duplicated the nuclear deal on ambiguity reached with Israel in 1969 in its dealings with Pakistan and South Africa in 1981. It puts the story of nuclear tests at the heart of a new Cold War historical narrative.
MoreLong description:
Most observers who follow nuclear history agree on one major aspect regarding Israel's famous policy of nuclear ambiguity; mainly that it is an exception. More specifically, it is largely accepted that the 1969 Nixon-Meir understanding, which formally established Israel's policy of nuclear ambiguity and transformed it from an undeclared Israeli strategy into a long-lasting undisclosed bilateral agreement, was in fact a singularity, aimed at allowing Washington to turn a blind eye to the existence of an Israeli arsenal. According to conventional wisdom, this nuclear bargain was a foreign policy exception on behalf of Washington, an exception which reflected a relationship growing closer and warmer between the superpower leading the free world and its small Cold War associate. Contrary to the orthodox narrative, this research demonstrates that this was not the case. The 1969 bargain was not, in fact, an exception, but rather the first of three Cold War era deals on nuclear tests brokered by Washington with its Cold War associates, the other two being Pakistan and South Africa. These two deals are not well known and until now were discussed and explored in the literature in a very limited fashion. Bargaining on Nuclear Tests places the role of nuclear tests by American associates, as well as Washington's attempts to prevent and delay them, at the heart of a new nuclear history narrative.
Or Rabinowitz provides a fascinating glimpse inside the hidden history of American efforts to persuade Israel, India, South Africa and Pakistan not to test nuclear weapons.
Table of Contents:
Introduction
The Paradox of Hegemony
The NPT, Nuclear Tests and Their Changing Legal Status
The American Test Ban Debate
Israel
South Africa
Pakistan
India
Conclusions
