Making and Breaking Governments
Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies
Series: Political Economy of Institutions and Decisions;
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Product details:
- Publisher Cambridge University Press
- Date of Publication 26 January 1996
- ISBN 9780521432450
- Binding Hardback
- No. of pages316 pages
- Size 235x155x23 mm
- Weight 539 g
- Language English
- Illustrations 41 b/w illus. 37 tables 0
Categories
Short description:
Making and Breaking Governments theorizes on how parties create, maintain, or replace new governments.
MoreLong description:
Making and Breaking Governments offers a theoretical argument about how parliamentary parties form governments, deriving from the political and social context of such government formation its generic sequential process. Based on their policy preferences, and their beliefs about what policies will be forthcoming from different conceivable governments, parties behave strategically in the game in which government portfolios are allocated. The authors construct a mathematical model of allocation of ministerial portfolios, formulated as a noncooperative game, and derive equilibria. They also derive a number of empirical hypotheses about outcomes of this game, which they then test with data drawn from most of the postwar European parliamentary democracies. The book concludes with a number of observations about departmentalistic tendencies and centripetal forces in parliamentary regimes.
"Laver and Shepsle have produced an expertly executed manuscript that will have a profound effect on the study of government coalitions for years to come....their focus on agenda powers is seminal, provocative, and profound." Kaare Strom, Legislative Studies Quarterly
Table of Contents:
Series editors' preface; Acknowledgements; Part I. The Context: 1. Theory, institutions, and government formation; 2. The social context of government formation; 3. The government formation process; Part II. The Model: 4. Government equilibrium; 5. Strong parties; Part III. Empirical Investigations: 6. Two cases: Germany, 1987; Ireland, 1992-3; 7. Theoretical implications, data, and operationalization; 8. Exploring the model: a comparative perspective; 9. A multivariate investigation of portfolio allocation; Part IV. Applications, Extensions, and Conclusions: 10. Party systems and cabinet stability; 11. Making the model more realistic; 12. Party politics and administrative reform; 13. Governments and parliaments; Bibliography.
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