How Democracies Lose Small Wars
State, Society, and the Failures of France in Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam
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Product details:
- Publisher Cambridge University Press
- Date of Publication 4 August 2003
- ISBN 9780521008778
- Binding Paperback
- No. of pages310 pages
- Size 229x154x19 mm
- Weight 414 g
- Language English
- Illustrations 2 b/w illus. 16 tables 0
Categories
Short description:
This 2003 book examines how modern democracies fail in insurgency wars because they are unable to find a winning balance.
MoreLong description:
In this 2003 book, Gil Merom argues that modern democracies fail in insurgency wars because they are unable to find a winning balance between expedient and moral tolerance to the costs of war. Small wars, he argues, are lost at home when a critical minority mass shifts the center of gravity from the battlefield to the market place of ideas. Merom analyzes the role of brutality in counterinsurgency, the historical foundations of moral and expedient opposition to war, and the actions states traditionally took in order to preserve foreign policy autonomy. He then discusses the elements of the process that led to the failure of France in Algeria and Israel in Lebanon. In the conclusion, Merom considers the Vietnam War and the influence failed small wars had on Western war-making and military intervention.
'Anyone who thinks the recent victories in Afghanistan and Iraq show that America's military machine is invincible should read Gil Merom's terrific new book. It not only reminds us that powerful democracies sometimes lose wars against weaker foes, as happened with the United States in Vietnam and Israel in Lebanon, but it also provides a compelling explanation for these surprising outcomes.' John J. Mearsheimer, University of Chicago
Table of Contents:
1. Introduction; 2. Military superiority and victory in small wars: historical observations; 3. The structural original of defiance: the middle-class, the marketplace of ideas, and the normative gap; 4. The structural origins of tenacity: national alignment and compartmentalization; 5. The French war in Algeria: a strategic, political, and economic overview; 6. French instrumental dependence and its consequences; 7. The development of a normative difference in France and its consequences; 8. The French struggle to contain the growth of the normative gap and the rise of the 'democratic agenda'; 9. Political relevance and its consequences in France; 10. The Israeli war in Lebanon: a strategic, political, and economic overview; 11. Israeli instrumental dependence and its consequences; 12. The development of a normative difference in Israel and its consequences; 13. The Israeli struggle to contain the growth of the normative gap and the rise of the 'democratic agenda'; 14. Political relevance and its consequences in Israel.
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