Deterrence under Uncertainty:: Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Warfare

Deterrence under Uncertainty:

Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Warfare
 
Publisher: OUP Oxford
Date of Publication:
 
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Product details:

ISBN13:9780192886323
ISBN10:01928863211
Binding:Hardback
No. of pages:256 pages
Size:240x161x18 mm
Weight:628 g
Language:English
Illustrations: 17
641
Category:
Short description:

A practitioner's perspective on how artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies could change the role of nuclear weapons in international relations. Geist argues that artificial intelligence could make a huge impact on deterrence and strategic stability even if it does not render retaliatory forces vulnerable.

Long description:
For decades, films such as WarGames and The Terminator have warned that the combination of artificial intelligence and nuclear weapons might be a recipe for an apocalypse. Might these prophecies of doom become reality in coming decades?

Using insights from computer science, Deterrence under Uncertainty: Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Warfare evaluates how AI could make nuclear war winnable, and whether that possibility is likely. Detailed chapters explain how the landscape of nuclear deterrence is changing and debunks the myths of machine intelligence and nuclear weapons. This book gives a practitioner's perspective on how artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies could change the role of nuclear weapons in international relations.

Geist, steeped in the history and craft of deception as a specialist in defence policy and security, thinks even the smartest agent can be made self destructively stupid by subterfuge. Fakery is so cheap and effective that Geist envisions a future where AI-driven "fog-of-war machines" create a world that favours neither side, but backs "those who seek to confound".
Table of Contents:
Introduction: Artificial Intelligence and the Nuclear Dilemma
The Emerging Strategic Environment
From Celluloid Nightmares to Silicon Realities
No Place to Hide?
Recipe for a WOPR
Fog-of-War Machines
Strategic Stability in a Deception-Dominant World
Conclusion: A Case for (Tempered) Optimism
Appendix A: The Mathematics of Tracking
Appendix B: A Bayesian Perspective on Camouflage, Concealment, and Deception
Appendix C: A Rudimentary Model of Ontological Confrontation
Index