Unelected Power: The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State

Unelected Power

The Quest for Legitimacy in Central Banking and the Regulatory State
 
Publisher: Princeton University Press
Date of Publication:
Number of Volumes: Print PDF
 
Normal price:

Publisher's listprice:
GBP 30.00
Estimated price in HUF:
14 490 HUF (13 800 HUF + 5% VAT)
Why estimated?
 
Your price:

13 041 (12 420 HUF + 5% VAT )
discount is: 10% (approx 1 449 HUF off)
The discount is only available for 'Alert of Favourite Topics' newsletter recipients.
Click here to subscribe.
 
Availability:

Estimated delivery time: Currently 3-5 weeks.
Not in stock at Prospero.
Can't you provide more accurate information?
 
  Piece(s)

 
 
 
 
Product details:

ISBN13:9780691176734
ISBN10:0691176736
Binding:Hardback
No. of pages:656 pages
Size:234x155 mm
Weight:858 g
Language:English
12
Category:
Short description:

"Paul Tucker brings years of experience at the Bank of England and deep political-economic insights to the most contentious problem of governance today: the delegation of power to independent agencies of government. He shows that the Fed and other central banks have become powerful multipurpose institutions, escaping checks and balances, risking all independence. He then unpacks an entirely novel solution--his Principles for Delegation--which will set off a needed debate over reform for many years ahead."--John B. Taylor, Stanford University

"This book is a much-needed study of a much-neglected problem. Combining experience with theoretical expertise, Paul Tucker offers us an insightful and original account of how central banks and other unelected authorities need to be oriented and constrained within a democracy. Unelected Power is a significant contribution to both political theory and social science."--Philip Pettit, Princeton University and Australian National University

"How do we reconcile delegated authority with democratic legitimacy in an era when decisions are made increasingly by experts? In this magisterial and magnificent book, Paul Tucker, drawing on his extensive experience in central banking, provides us with clear principles for determining the trade-off between professional competence and popular support. A must-read for anyone interested in the theory and practice of governance."--Mervyn King, former governor of the Bank of England

"An important book on a fundamental problem--by an author who combines theoretical intelligence and practical experience in a compelling fashion."--Bruce Ackerman, Yale University

"Paul Tucker has written a most timely and thoughtful analysis of the role of independent agencies in democratic societies. He makes clear that in practice these agencies differ widely in their practical and justifiable insulation from political pressures. Not surprisingly, he concludes by defending a high degree of independence for central banks but also emphasizing the need for caution in extending their mandate beyond the bounds of monetary policy."--Paul A. Volcker, former chair of the Federal Reserve

"Paul Tucker has written a most timely and thoughtful analysis of the role of independent agencies in democratic societies. He makes clear that in practice these agencies differ widely in their practical and justifiable insulation from political pressures. Not surprisingly, he concludes by defending a high degree of independence for central banks but also emphasizing the need for caution in extending their mandate beyond the bounds of monetary policy."--Paul A. Volcker, former chair of the Federal Reserve

"Unelected Power is a well-researched, extremely knowledgeable, and authoritative account by a leading expert. It is destined to be one of the most important books on this increasingly topical and contentious subject."--Charles Goodhart, London School of Economics

"A powerful and important book, Unelected Power reshapes the debate about independent regulatory agencies."--Kevin M. Stack, Vanderbilt Law School

Long description:

Guiding principles for ensuring that central bankers and other unelected policymakers remain stewards of the common good

Central bankers have emerged from the financial crisis as the third great pillar of unelected power alongside the judiciary and the military. They pull the regulatory and financial levers of our economic well-being, yet unlike democratically elected leaders, their power does not come directly from the people. Unelected Power lays out the principles needed to ensure that central bankers, technocrats, regulators, and other agents of the administrative state remain stewards of the common good and do not become overmighty citizens.

Paul Tucker draws on a wealth of personal experience from his many years in domestic and international policymaking to tackle the big issues raised by unelected power, and enriches his discussion with examples from the United States, Britain, France, Germany, and the European Union. Blending economics, political theory, and public law, Tucker explores the necessary conditions for delegated but politically insulated power to be legitimate in the eyes of constitutional democracy and the rule of law. He explains why the solution must fit with how real-world government is structured, and why technocrats and their political overseers need incentives to make the system work as intended. Tucker explains how the regulatory state need not be a fourth branch of government free to steer by its own lights, and how central bankers can emulate the best of judicial self-restraint and become models of dispersed power.

Like it or not, unelected power has become a hallmark of modern government. This critically important book shows how to harness it to the people's purposes.



"One of Foreign Affairs' Picks for Best of Books 2018"